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Federal Tax Law: 




Cliff effects in the Internal Revenue Code trigger a sudden 
increase of tax liability when some attribute of a taxpayer—typically 
income—exceeds a particular threshold value. As a result, two 
taxpayers in nearly identical economic situations can face 
considerably different tax liabilities depending on which side of the 
triggering criterion they fall. The magnitude of the equity and 
efficiency costs associated with cliff effects is significant: Cliff 
effects are attached to tax provisions amounting to hundreds of 
billions of dollars, the majority of which targets low- and moderate-
income taxpayers. These income-based cliff effects are problematic 
on both equity and efficiency grounds because they improperly 
penalize taxpayers and disincentivize the economic empowerment 
these tax provisions are often intended to promote. These 
problematic tax provisions should be replaced by statutes that ensure 
that no taxpayer is made worse off post-tax simply by virtue of 
earning more income pre-tax. 
 
Why Do Cliff Effects Exist? 
 
Cliff effects in the Internal Revenue Code represent a subset of 
the line drawing that occurs with respect to all governmental 
regulation. In order to measure, assess, proscribe, or tax behavior, 
that behavior must first be identified. This line drawing in the 
Internal Revenue Code causes taxpayers close to but on opposite 
sides of some triggering criterion to incur varying amounts of tax 
liability. When the difference in tax liability is significant, the result 
is known as a cliff effect. 
These cliff effects exist for a variety of reasons. Some tax 
provisions are intended to benefit certain favored groups, such as the 
poor, that must be defined. Cliff effects can also be simple 
mechanisms by which cost-saving measures can be implemented. 
                                                 
1. Summarized and excerpted from Manoj Viswanathan, The Hidden 
Costs of Cliff Effects in the Internal Revenue Code, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 931 
(2016). 
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Computationally, the cost of a benefit ending immediately at a 
specific income is easier to calculate than a benefit that varies as a 
function of income level. Lastly, cliff effects also have political 
appeal, in that the benefitting (or punished) group of taxpayers is 
more easily identified if the triggering criterion is some specific 
number. For instance, Senator Chuck Grassley’s description of the 
deduction for qualified tuition and related expenses as “a beneficial 
tax incentive for the middle class” was bolstered by fact that the 
deduction was eliminated entirely for taxpayers earning more, even 
by one dollar, than $80,000. 
 
Identifying Income-Based Cliff Effects 
 
An income-based cliff effect imposes, at some point, a marginal 
tax rate of greater than 100%. For example, in 2017 the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (“EITC”) is eliminated completely for taxpayers 
earning more than $3,450 in investment income. If a taxpayer with 
two children would otherwise qualify for an EITC of $5,000, earning 
$3,451 in investment income would subject this taxpayer to a 
marginal tax rate of 500,000%. 
Although a cliff effect has implications for income earned 
beyond the effect's threshold, a marginal tax rate greater than 100% 
exists only at the cliff effect threshold. Assuming the taxpayer in the 
above example is in the 15% marginal tax bracket, her next dollar of 
investment income after passing the cliff effect would increase her 
tax liability by only fifteen cents. 
Yet the force of the cliff effect lingers over a much larger range 
of income. Assuming the income of the taxpayer in the above 
example remains in the 15% bracket, she would need to earn 
approximately $5,880 more before she returned to the economic 
position she was in prior to the cliff effect. The magnitude of the 
impact a cliff effect has on an individual taxpayer, then, must be 
analyzed not just by using the marginal tax rate for the first dollar 
earned beyond the cliff effect but also by examining how much 
additional income the taxpayer would need to earn to offset the 
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Assessing the Burden of Income-Based Cliff Effects 
 
Cliff effects in the Internal Revenue Code based on a taxpayer’s 
income violate principles of equity and efficiency. These tax 
provisions implicitly define taxpayers as members either of a lower-
income and benefit-receiving group or of a higher-income and 
nonbenefit-receiving group. In theory, this demarcation exists to 
accurately advance the goals of the tax provision by limiting the 
benefitting recipients to a defined group based on income. 
But this categorization of taxpayers by pre-tax income directly 
conflicts with the rationale behind the tax provision, resulting in a 
flawed implementation of the provision. Separating taxpayers into 
these groups pre-tax should result in the low-income and benefit-
receiving group being better off. But if a member of the group 
receiving benefits is in a better economic position than a member of 
the group not receiving benefits, the tax provision will undermine the 
objectives of properly classifying taxpayers. As a result of the cliff 
effect’s operation and the imposition of a marginal tax rate greater 
than 100%, taxpayers barely exceeding the income limit of the cliff 
effect will be in a worse economic situation than taxpayers falling 
just short of the cliff-effect threshold. The use of cliff effects to 
classify taxpayers as eligible or ineligible by reason of income, 
therefore, is unfair and inefficient for some number of taxpayers just 
beyond the cliff effect. 
For every violation of equity, a theoretical minimum dollar 
amount exists that can be transferred to the suffering taxpayer to cure 
the equity violation. This “equity cost” represents the cost of 
modifying a tax provision that is structurally unsound on equity 
grounds to a provision that is not. (The term “equity cost,” previously 
unrecognized in the literature, is an aggregate microeconomic metric 
that represents the net economic loss suffered by all taxpayers who 
are in a worse economic situation post-tax than they would have been 
had they not exceeded the cliff-effect threshold.) If the cliff effect 
creating the equity cost is an income-based cliff effect attached to a 
means-tested tax provision, the equity cost represents a flaw in the 
implementation of the tax provision. If the tax provision is intended 
to benefit a group of taxpayers who are means-tested on a pre-tax 
basis by increasing their economic position, the tax provision should 
not make these beneficiaries better off than a group of taxpayers 
ineligible for the benefit by virtue of earning more. Either the subsidy 
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provided by the tax provision is being awarded to taxpayers who do 
not need it, or the subsidy is not being provided to those taxpayers 
who do. Estimating this “equity cost” is necessary to assess whether 
any advantages from the cliff effect with respect to definitional 
clarity and simplicity outweigh any costs imposed on the taxpaying 
public from the behavioral changes induced and equity violations 
created.  
The aggregate equity cost of the cliff effects present in the 
health-premium-credit provisions of the Affordable Care Act is 
approximately $8.5 billion between 2014 and 2024. Although low- to 
moderate-income taxpayers are in a better economic position overall 
because of the premium credit, the significant equity cost represents 
a flaw in the credit’s implementation. The premium credit is intended 
to enable low- to moderate-income taxpayers to affordably procure 
health insurance for themselves and their families. But the premium 
credit, at two levels of income eligibility, makes certain taxpayers 
worse off post-tax than these taxpayers would have been had they 
earned less income pre-tax. Such a result undermines the normative 
justifications for the premium credit’s existence. 
 
Proposals for Change 
 
To assess the validity of a cliff effect, the goals of the tax 
provision to which the cliff effect is attached must be determined. 
The benefits provided by the cliff effect should be compared to 
alternative scenarios in which the cliff effect is replaced by a benefit-
limiting substitute that does not impose a marginal tax rate greater 
than 100%. Of critical importance is determining the extent to which 
the cliff effect advances the stated goal of the tax provision and at 
what cost. 
Any cliff effect based on income imposing costs greater than any 
social utility it creates can be eliminated by phasing out the benefit 
over a span of income starting either before or at the cliff-effect 
threshold rather than eliminating the benefit entirely. However, using 
a phase-out results in either a greater total cost of the benefit or a 
reduction in benefits to some recipients. Although taxpayers will not 
be subjected to a cliff effect, some taxpayers will be worse off than 
they were with the cliff effect in place. Cliff effects based on income 
imposing costs greater than the social utility they create can be 
replaced with phase-outs imposing marginal tax rates of less than 
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100%. Where the phase-out should begin and end depends on the 
social utility of the tax provision in question at the cliff-effect 
threshold, and on whether or not the modification should be revenue 
neutral. 
Any solution to mitigate the harsh consequences of cliff effects 
must not harm taxpayers any more than the cliff effect it is replacing. 
Taxpayers can be protected from suffering the equity cost of the cliff 
effect by awarding each affected taxpayer a credit to bring her post-
tax economic position to the maximum level it would have been had 
she earned less income. Consider, for example, a taxpayer who loses 
a $1,000 tax benefit once her income reaches $20,000. If this 
taxpayer’s income is $20,400 and the income beyond $20,000 is 
taxed at 25%, she is economically worse off by $700 by earning the 
extra $400 beyond the $20,000 cliff effect. A $700 credit would 
compensate the taxpayer for the burden of the cliff effect.  
Another way to ensure taxpayers are not economically worse off 
post-tax from earning additional income is to ensure that taxpayers 
will not endure marginal tax rates greater than some fixed 
percentage. Even if every cliff effect were converted into a phase-
out, taxpayers may still experience high marginal tax rates for 
income earned beyond the eliminated cliff effect. The phase-out 
range for one tax expenditure could overlap with the phase-out range 
of another. This can result in a marginal tax rate greater than 100% 
even though the phase-out percentages of each individual tax 
provision are less than 100%. A solution to this issue is to limit the 
maximum marginal tax rate that a taxpayer must face. The phase-out 
rates for various provisions would, in effect, not be constant but 
would vary according to an individual’s particular marginal tax rate 
profile. If, for example, this maximum marginal tax rate were 40%, a 
taxpayer would be assured that any additional income earned would 





When triggered by a taxpayer's income, cliff effects necessarily 
leave some taxpayers in a worse economic position than if they had 
earned less. When the costs associated with cliff effects outweigh the 
gains obtained from the simplicity of bright-line rules, tax provisions 
should be rewritten to eliminate the cliff effect. Of special note is a 
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guarantee that no taxpayer is made worse off post-tax simply by 
virtue of earning more pre-tax income.  
This analysis focuses on cliff effects in the Internal Revenue 
Code but has implications on cliff effects found in state and local 
direct-transfer programs as well. Similar to cliff effects in the 
Internal Revenue Code, the simplicity gains obtained from cliff 
effects associated with state and local tax regimes and direct-transfer 
programs should be compared to the burdens imposed on taxpayers 
whose benefits are suddenly terminated. 
Cliff effects, even if designed to precisely define terms requiring 
clarity and promoting some desired behavior, should be used 
cautiously. Their use often undermines the intent of the statutes to 
which they are attached. The proposals set forth herein to assess, 
measure, and remedy existing and proposed cliff effects are a step 
towards improving the equity and efficiency of benefits provided in 
the Internal Revenue Code, state and local tax regimes, and direct-
transfer programs. 
 
